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Editor's Introduction

T

HE NEO-KANTlAN READER aims to make accessi ble to the English-speaking reader a
repre sentative selection of translations of primary read ing s of the Neo-Kanlian tradition/

whi ch is without a doubt the most broadly influential movement of European philosophy between
approximately 1850 and 1918. 1 The Neo-Kantian Movement was inspired by the battle cry
" back to Kant/' mainly t o counter scientific positivism and weltanschaulicli materiali sm in the
mid-nineteenth century. 80th tendencies had entered the cu ltural mainstream and seemed to
suggest an abolit ion of phi losophy altogether and a general decline of culture and its va lues. '

Coming after the so-called collapse of German Idealism and on the heels of the rampant scie nlism,
the Neo- Kantians wanted to revive the spirit of Kant by goin g back to Kant. Going back to Kant,
however, meant \\going beyond " him. Going beyond the founder of the critica l method was
motivate d by the scien t ific and soci a-political developments of the present, which necessitated, in
turn, an upd ating of Kant's original position in the light of these nove l

develop~ents.

Soon aft er an openi ng era th at is r ather hard to ch aracter ize in its varied tendenc ies, two
" powe r ce nters" emerged in Marburg and in Germany's Southwest ( Freib ur g and Heidelberg ),
which brought forth such thinkers as Herm ann Cohen, Pau l Natorp and Ernst Cass irer <the
Marburg Sc hool) and Wilhelm Wi ndel band, Heinrich Ri ckert and Emil Lask <the Southwest
or "Baden " School). The \\i mperial reign " (as Haberm as once puts ill of Neo -Kanti anism in
German-speaki ng areas lasted from approximately 1860 until 1Q18. In the interim peri od
after th e Great War, Neo -Ka ntianism became identified as a staid, conservative philosophy
that was attached, both intellectually as well as phil oso phi cally, to the German

Kaiserreich and

its stale values. Neo-Kantianism remaine d the philosophical parad igm dur ing the 1920s, while
newer movements such as phenomenology ascended." Its fi nal deathblow occurred in 19 33,
when the last living representatives of an erstwhile domineering phi losophical com mun ity were
forced to leave Germany.
The readings sel ected here offer a representative selection of these thinkers. The cho ice of
read ings is intended to lead the reader through the main stages in the development of Neo Kantianism. The selections are taken from the key work s of the Neo-Kantian philosqphers,
st arting from the polymath Heinrich Helmholtz to arguably the last Neo- Kantian, Ernst
Cassirer, who died in 1 Q45, thou gh debates about when
ended will no doubt con ti nue.

exactly Neo-Kan ti anism began and
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• Classical Neo-Kantianism: Attempt at a Brief Definition
What is Neo-Kantiani sm? Who are the Neo-Kantians? Let us begin with a brief (attempt at a)
definiti on of Neo-Kantianism. In t rivial terms, Neo-K antianism is a philosophy that attempts
to revive ~a nt 's philosophy. Immediately, several questions may ensue. What is Kant's
philoso ph y about? Why would his ph ilosophy be in need of a revival? What does it mean to
revive Kant's phil osop hy? It is fair to say that with in the group of thinkers whom nineteenthand twentieth-century histor iography ' has grouped, somewhat randomly, into this category,
these V:Je re the questions that we re debated. But it is also clear that there we re then, and are
now, no unified answers to these questions. Indeed, the entire Neo-Kantian movement can be
seen as discussing and emphatically disagreeing on possible an swe rs to these (and other>
questions. Even the term Neo-Kantianism was co ntested. As in most -isms, one needs to bear
in mind that it is, fo r th e most part, a label appended to these th inkers by others, mostly critics.
Seen in th is light, many of those whom we co nsi der staunchly embedded in the Neo-Kan t ian
movem ent, did not see t hemselves as furthering !(ant's philosophy at all, and they woul d have
rejected this label outr ight. Other titles were used by representatives we now group under the
label Neo-Kantian ism; some other t itl es we re ( Neo-)Cri tic ism, value theory (or va luetheoretic al philosophy), and others. Other labe ls were used by the bystanders, for instance,
Neo-Fichtean ism . With in the Neo-Kantian movement the re were at least two different "camps"
(in Marburg an,d the Southwest>, not t o men tion isolat ed "satellites," who disagree d on their
. interpretations of Kant and st ood fo r very different phil osoph ical directions.
Given the I'i mpe rial reign" of Neo-Kantian phi losophers, it is perhaps best to call the
period between approximately 1860 and 1918, in terms of ph il osophical historiography, the
age or era of Neo-Kantianism. Its representatives were the most important thinkers of their
day, both wi thi.n academia and in terms of admiration bestowed upon them by a learned public,
the German Bildung5bu~gertum, who adored the ir 'I Mandarins," to use a term famously coined
by Fritz Ringer to describe the German professoriate, with almost rel igious devotio n.
Often slan dered as II Professorenphifosophie" or II Kathederphi/o50phie" ("phi losophers'
philosophy" or " lectern ph ilosophy"), one formally defining, albeit completely extraneous,
trait of Neo-Kantianism deserves to be emphasize d. All Neo-Kantians were academics, Le.,
they held posi tions of some sort with in German academia {un like the academic fa il ures,
intentionally or not, such as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Marx, or Kie r kegaardL As suc h, the
Neo-Kanti ans were quite successful career phil osophers who we re in fluent ial within hi gher
,education in Germany and beyond, for instance in po li tical debates of the day, and they were
altogether quite comfortabl e in their bourgeois setti ng. 5 In t his capacity, they influen ced and in
some cases defined academic politi cs (esp. with respect t o philosop hy) at universities guided by
the Humboldtian ideal (the un ity of r esearch and teaching). In th is sense, a defining feature of
the Neo-Kantians was certain ly the image of the typical academic of the nineteenth century:
male (on this more below), bespectacled, with impressive beards and gold-chained pocket
watches adorni ng the ir equally impressive midsections. As Mandarins, they preached the ir
philosophies from the lectern with a ste rn Teuton ic demeanor.b In hindsight, they appear as
ultra-co nservative defenders of the Ger man Kaiserreich, despite the fact that politically, most
of them we re left-leaning li berals and soc ialist s (or perhaps better, ~'s ocial - idealists").
Thus, despite this formal commo nality, when we speak of " Neo-Kantianism" and "the NeoKantians" t oday, the curre nt reader shoul d be aware that one is deal ing with anything but a
unified sc hool or a unified group of philosophers who have so me sense of agreement amongst
themselves as t o what t hey -stand for. On the other hand, their strongho ld in the academic (not
j ust ph ilosophical) scene of the ir t ime was hard-earned and not aCCidental; thus, what the reader
can expect is a plet~o ra of extremely interesting, original, and th ought-provoking material that
has relevance for today as well. Wh~ n people nowadays use the te rm \\ Neo-Kanti ans" and mean
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Christine Korsgaard or JOrgen Habermas, they should be aware that this practi ce has a tradition
reaching back some one hundred years, in that Husserl or Heidegger referred to their
contemporaries in the same way. For the intellectual development of European thought in the
nineteenth and twentieth centu r ies, an understanding of the positions and figures of Neo ~
Kantianism is close to being indispensable for understandi ng the transition from German Idealism

to nineteenth-century scientific posi tivism to

pheno~enologYI

existentialism, hermeneutics,

logical positivism, and beyond. Having been almost completely neglected for some half century,

the Neo-Kan.tians are the great missing link in th is historical trajectory. Nobody who wants to
cla im acquaintance with the history of modern philosophy and Western intellectual history can
dispense with at least a certain amount of knowledge of thi s period and its thin kers. Th is
anthology should be able to supply an initial introduction to thi s body of knowledge.
In the foll owing, I will trace, in briefest terms, the developmental stages of Neo-Kantianism
to give the present reader a certain historical map' to orient herself (ct. also the timel ine see
pages ix-x vii l.

Earl y History (1 845- 1871 )
The stages of Neo-Kantiani sm are certainly debated and that is a good thing, as different
perspectives will order the stages differently . Given the text selections of th is Reader, I have
opted to call thi s period, ranging somewhere from 1845- 1871, the "early history" of NeoKantianism. This early period is bookended on the one side by Helmho ltz 's early texts and, on
the other, by the publication of Cohen 's first edition of Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1871) ,
which ushers in the Aowering of the two schools in Marburg and the Southwest.
Prior to, and concurren t with, th is period fall the writings of late Idealists or early Ne.oKantians, depending on how one wants to label them (figures such as the younger Fichte, Fries,
HerbarO, though I have chosen to extend this period to include Helmho ltz, Liebmann, Lange,
an d Lotze. Espec ially the inclusion of Lotze in thi s group of th inker s shows how debatable
these decisions are. Lotze is certa inly not philosophical ly close t o Liebmann a'nd Lange, though
he clearly has had an enormous influence on the Sou thwest School' s theory of value. Liebmann
and Lange certain ly belong to the group of outspoken Neo*Kantians, wi th Liebmann's battle
cry of " back to Kant " resonating wi th many th inkers at the t ime, and with Lange serv ing as the
first Neo-Kantian professor in phil osophy at the Uni ver sity of Marburg and being responsible
. for the contentious hiring of Cohen, a Jew, as his successor.
P!,)ilosophicall y, this early period is marked by a spe Cifically naturalistic or psycho logisti c
reading of Kant, especia lly in Helmholtz and the early Cohen, who publi shed his first writings
in the Zeitschrift fur Vijlkerpsycholog ie und Sprachwissenschaft (Journal for Folk Psychology
and Linguistics), a journal that offers (in the words of Edgar), \\an anthropological investigation
of the orig ins of cultural products such as art and Iiterature'l7 . A co mmon interpretation of
Kant involved the rejection of the synthetic a priori in favor of a naturalistic interpretation of
anthropological commonali t ies, such that one can speak of thi s first period as a physiological
Kantianism. Th is characterization of the period is supported by the fact that it is a common
trait in the transition to the fl owering of the Neo-Kantian move ment that the vast majority of
major Neo-Kant ians (with the exception, perhaps, of Alois Riehl ) went on to reject any
phYSiologi cal or naturalistic Kant interpretati~~ as co nstitut ing a retreat into subjectivism or
psychologi sm. Indeed, Cohen came into his own, one can say, through a radically anti subjectivistic reading of Kant in his 1871 Kants Theo rie der Erfahrung, a reading that will
become only stronger in subsequent editions. L ikewise, the texts selected from Lange,
Liebmann, and Lotze are already a reaction to the physiological interpretation of Kant that
they encountered in the writings of their contemporaries. Thus, one can speak of "Neo-
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• J<antianism" in a more substantial sense of the term as the rejection of a psychologislic Kant
interpretation, which thinkers such as Helmholtz found attractive, and as the, only way one
could remain a \\KantianO in light of the current developments in the sciences.

Flowering (1871-1914). The Formation ofthe Two Schools in
Marburg and the Southwest
The la~ter quarter of the nineteenth century is without doubt the era of Neo-Kantianism, in the
sense that it had established a stronghold in professional and academic philosophy. This era

lasted until the beginning of the Great War. The two emerging power centers were in Marburg
and the Southwest. Let us begin with the Marburg School.
The Marburg School, as a school with a distinct phi losophical orientation, began
histbrically with Cohen's arrival in Marburg in 1873 and his assumption of the chair left
vacant by Lange's death in 1876. As already suggested, arranging for the Jewish Cohen to
assume this professorship was quite the "coup II at the time, in light of the more or less open
anti-Semitism in German academia. He was joined by Natorp in 1881, who first worked in the
university library, assuming a professorship in 1893 (dedicated to philosophy and also
pedagogy). The two can be seen as the Iltwin stars" of the Marburg School, exerting a widera nging influen~e in Marburg and beyond. The term II Marburg School" became an established
· term in German-speaking academia around 1900, where the idea of a school establishment
(Schulbildung) was very much part of the philosophical "profile." This meant that there was a
clear distinction between Cohen, who was the undisputed (intellectual as well as emotional)
leader of the school, and Natorp, as the undisputed "second in command,"B surrounded by a
group of young novices whose task was to "sign on" and carry further the banner of the school
after their teachers' demise. 9 Ernst Cassirer was nel1er a novice in this sense and was more of
a distant. satellite, though philosophically he can be seen as part of the Marburg School. The
school's bloom was between 1900 and 1910, with some crises between then and the beginning
of the Great War. In 1918, Cohen left Marburg to live in Berlin, while Natorp w.as left to fend
for himself. Once Heidegger came to Marburg in 1922, the fox was in the chicken coop, so to
speak, though it speaks to Natorp's honesty that he was in favor of Heidegger's move to
Marburg. Natorp died in 1924 and left no students behind; none at least who wou ld have been
able to carryon the school tradition. In 1929, after the famous Davos Dispute between Cassirer
· and Heidegger, it was the general impression that Neo-Kantianism in the form of the Marburg
School had been "finished off." In 1933, Cassirer left Germany altogether and the last
remnants of the Marburg School had been all but obliterated.
Philosophically, the school can be subsumed under two key notions: the "transcendental
method II as the general method utilized by the schoo l, and the overall project of a philosophy
of culture. The transcendental method was the method of starting out from a factum to begin
the work of transcendental philosophy (following the analytiC method Kant had used in the
Prolegomena) , with the important addition that this factum had to be the factum of science
(das Faktum der Wissenschaft>. Thus was Cohen's readi ng of Kant's first Critique: the notion
of experience Kant had in mind was the experience of modern sCi.entists, who "experience"
nature not as a brute fact, but as obeying and standing under mathematical-physical laws.
Hence, the transcendental method had to inquire into the conditions of the possibility of this
Newtonian physical science, not as a psychological or historical investigation, but as an inquiry
into the conceptual work that is underway as science produces its results, which are laws and
concepts. This was th.e main "work " on the part of the Marburg School and it had its greatest
impact here. It is .for this reason that the Marburg School had come to be identified with
critica l or transcendental philosop.hy of science.
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The second hal lmark of th is school - namely, its project of developing a ph ilosophy of
cu lture - is extremely misleading in light of the Marburg School 's sel f -interpretation l although
th e overall reception of thi s school as offering mainly a theory of natural science might, in the
end, be just ified. For the overall goal of the School was to apply the transcendental method t o
all spheres of culture, fo llowing Kant 's canonica l dist inction bet wee n logic,· ethics, and
aesthetics. Accordingly, the transcendental method had to be applied to each respective factum
of science of each cul tura l sphere, and so to morali ty (lega lity) and aesthetics, in addition to
scie nce and C09niti on. 10 Thus, the ambition was to account philosophically for each part of
reality that is created by the human being and according to th e latter 's creative capaci t ies, in
short, f or culture writ large. It might seem obvious that a philosophy of .culture that began wit h
the different facta of the sciences - for example, in Cohen 's system, with jurisprudence as the
science of eth ics, and wi th art hist ory as the science of aesthetics - co uld be conceived as
probl ematic by their contemporaries, and it was "for this reason that the Marburg School 's
ambition beyond logic and theory of cognitio n was fo r the most part ignored. When Cassirer
fam ously declares in Volume I of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms that " the cri tique of
reason turn s into the cri ti que of cu lture," he was echoing the basic stance of his teachers, yet
his success as a philosopher of culture lay, arguably, in his making a decisive break with the
tran sce nden ta l method as it had been conce ived and practiced by Cohen and Natorp.
Other areas of work in the Marburg School included Natorp's wri t ings on psychology,
whose main influence lay in pav ing the way for Husserl 's later phenomeno logy in a transcendental
register, and Natorp's works in social and pedagogical ph ilosophy, which all st ood under the
banner of " idealism" (hence "Social-I dealism" and "Social Pedagogy ">'
The Southwest School derived its name from its locations in Freiburg and Heidelberg, in
the southwest of Germany, a two-hour train ride apart . Becau se it was located in the State of
Baden (which was combined with Wu rttemberg after World War II, to form the S tat~ of
Baden-Wurttemberg ), it was also ca lled the Baden School of Neo- Kantian ism. Due to its
philosophical orientation, it was ca lled - to contrast wi th the "cri tici sm" of the Marburgersthe \'va lue-theoretical" (werttheoretische) school of Neo- Kantianism. Its first representative
- not quite wi th the nimbus of Cohen - was Windelband, who taught first at ·Freiburg and later
(with stops in between) in Heidelberg. His most famou s pupil was Rickert, who succeeded
Windelband both in Freiburg and later, after Winde lband's death, in Heidelberg. Th ough
arguably more original and profound than Windelband, Rickert attracted fewer students due
to a psychological impairment (agoraphobia>. The " poster chil d" of the Southwest School was
the you nger Lask, whose premature death in the trenches of the Great Wa r certa inly hel ped t o
enshrine him in the pantheon of geniuses who died young. Lask was by al l accounts an orig inal
thinker who took his philosophy in a more r adical direct ion than his teachers, though, not
havi ng attained a professorsh ip at the time of his death, was seen as academically dependent
on Rickert (as well as Max Weber) in Hei de lberg.
The overall philosophical tendency of the Southwest School is rightfully indicated wi th the
term "value theory. " Its philosophical predecessor is clearly Lotze in his " transcendental"
reading of the Platonic theory of the Form s, which are more aptl y t o be described in their
ontological status as "vali diti es." It is in this " third real m" that values are to be located. Once
again reject ing a psychologist ic in terpretat ion of ideal entit ies, such a reading was to be
utilized as a bulwa rk against the threatening moral relat ivism that had been diagnosed,
fam ously, by Nietzsc he in his trope of the de~th of God. Th us, as a unive rsal value theory, the
Southwest interpretation was, like the Marburg School th ough with some decisive differences,
t o culminate in a philosophy of culture. In addition to a theory of values, the Southwesterners
contributed to the general discussion at the t ime (especially in critica l discussion with Di lthey)
surroundi ng the theory of (val ue-free) natural sci ences and (value -laden) Geisteswissenschaften,
i.e., the human or cul tura l sciences. This latter concern grew organically out of thei r concern
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,with va lues, sin ce it is the human sciences that deal wi th cultural va lues. Crit ically rejecting
Dilthey's distinction between natural sciences as explanatory and the human sciences as
interpreti ve, Windelband famously called for a methodological distinction' between two
different ways of attending to the object of cognition, either by way of sing ling out its
individua lities or seeing the individual object as a representative of universal laws (idiographic
versuS nomothet ic sciencesl. Rickert's theo ry concerning the object of cognition is a more
ambitious theory based on Windelband's more innocuous distinction. Nevertheless, wit h the
focus on a theory of val ues in- conj unction wi th the methodolog ical distinction between
individualistic and general sciences, the Southwest School displays thereby a distinctive profile
vis-a-vis the Marburg School and other com peting attempts at grasping the distinct character
of the non -natural sciences, and thereby defending the statu s of philosophy itself. Lask took the
latter problem into a new dimension when he set out to write a logic of phi losophy itself and its
sui generis doctrine of categor ies.

Decline and Late Neo-Kantianism
The decline of the late Neo-K antian movement can most appropriately be told from the
perspective of th ose who constructed for themselves, as Crowell puts it (quoted in note 4), a
" liberation n ~~rative,1I whic h would consist in calling out the shortcomings and mistakes on
the part of t he Neo-Kantians. Th is story can be best left to the heirs of the ini t ial liberators.
But from the perspective of the Neo-Kantian establishment, it was obvious that there were
hardly any successors left after the Great War and that the remaining Neo-Kantians had a
rather pessimistic view of the future of their movement. For in stance, Heidegger, who had been
a promi sing student of Rickert's, soon came under the sway of the phenomenologist Husserl
and abandoned the ship. In Marburg, there were no pupils left who had the power to gain
larger-scale influence 1f, and with the two power centers comi ng apart, the scattered NeoKantians left (in places such as Munich or Gtittingen) were not able t o sustain school unity or
a unified movement. Too strong were the novel philosophical forces that began ~hipping away
at the foundations of what was once a Continent-wide movement. The Great War, whic h did
away not only with Germany's political hegemony in Europe but its val ues and morals as we l l,
is not to be overloo"ked in doing its part in Neo-Kantianism's demi se. Indeed, in hindSight, the
new crop of students flocking to the universities and attempting to find grounding in
philosophi cal thought, were utterly disapPointed by the seemingly empty gestures of the
remaining Neo-Kantians. That some of them had been enthusiastic supporters of the Great
War, such as Natorp, certainly did not help the movement. Hence, the Neo-Kantians who
remained to car ry its banner forward we re perceived as backward-looking and inc apable of
providing any remedy to the rampant Ilcrisis" all around. Not only were they incapable of
providing help; worse, they were perceived as part of the old system that was held accountable
for the catastrophe of the Great War and its devastating aftermath.
Th.us, the interwar period has little to offer to the philosophical historian of NeoKantianism (though it is a most fru itful period for the historian of phenomenology). It was
populated by (mostl y second-rate) pupils of the great names, who ~ave more or less rightfully
been forgotten. The history of this short period is beset by pol itical infighting, as detailed, in
the case of Marburg, by Sieg, where the themes discussed can only be understood in historical
hindsight. For instance, the ski rm ishes fought vehemently between IIAryan" and Jewish
represe ntatives of Neo- Kantianism - ridiculous debates over whether Jews co uld adequately
understand Kant and. cou ld consequently be counted as part of the German cultura l heritage are uncannily pres~ient looking ba~k at this period knowing what happened in Germany as of
1933.
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Th e great schism came in 1933, when many Jews left Germany, among them many

philosophers who had some relation to the Neo-Ka nti ans (such as Cassirer or Honigswald), and
most philosophers remain ing in Germany were either incapable of resisting the national-

socialist \'pull/' or, in the case of Heidegge r, actively furthered it. It is, in th is contex t, not
surprising t hat Neo-Kantianism came to be identified and vilified by many Nazi !'philosophers "
as a philosophy of the Kaiserreich, both degenerate and inherently I'Jewish" in its substance.

But apart from the unfair identification of \\ Neo-Kantian" and "Jewish,'1 it would be indeed an
unwritten chapter of the philosophy of the twentieth century, which, were one to speculate on
how it might have been written, would have had to assess what would have happened to the
Neo-Kantian movement had someone like Ca'ssir er lived some more years in the US and
established a fo llowing. It perhaps woul d have completely re-shaped the philosophy of the
second half of the twentieth century, had some Neo-Kantians prevailed in the New World after
being driven from the European cont inent. As if was, Neo-Kantianism was dead in Europe,
never caught on in the New World, whereas others who fled, such as Strauss, Arendt, Carnap
and others, went on to become extremely influential, and the only philosopher to speak of who
remained standing in Germany was HeideggerY Imagining what could have happened had
history played itself out differently is speculation, of course, but such speculat ion may be
permitted a century after Neo-Ka ntiani sm's peak.

Reception and Legacy
Especially aft er their demise, the reception of Neo-Kant ianism was for the most part cri tic al
and even destructive. It became fashionable to pit one 's own attempts against the backdrop of
Neo-Kantianism. This is especial ly true for the budding Phenomenological Movement, ~ho se
defining characteristic - "to the things themselves! " (not " back to Kant") - is a battle cry
directed, in crit ical rejection, at the Neo-Kantian obsession wi th "empty speculation" and "ego
metaphysics. II The emphasis on the role of the subject and the individual and her existence is a
direct reaction to the "I ogicist " position of the Marburg School and the Southwest theory of
values, which seem to float in some heaven inaccessible to the individual. More recent research
reveal s that this " dialectical" image of the new emerging ph ilosophj~s, as negating in different
ways the posi t ion of t he Neo-Kantians, is certainly exaggerated and can only be understood in
hindSight, and much more work must be done to fu lly uncover the many filiations and overlaps
between the Neo-Kantians and the ir contemporariesY
. As for the legacy of Neo-Kantian ism, it would lead too far afield to spell this out here l4 ,
but it bears mentioning that Kant scholarship in the twentieth century, including in the AngloAmerican world, would have been impossible without the prior work done by the classical NeoKantians. If one defining project, among others, of Neo-Kant ian ism was its project of a
philosophy of culture, then one must emphasize that today 's cu ltura l studies, both empirical as
well as philosophical, owe a great deal to the Neo-Kant ians. Final ly, today's philosophy of
science has discovered the interesting approaches especially of the Marburg School.
Contemporary history of science has also come to the realization that the Neo-Kantian era is a
nearly untapped reSource for its work. Moreover, the theory of ph ilosoph ical historiography
has, as of late, sparked newer reflections. ~~ rhaps reflecting a weariness with the many forms
and shapes of contemporary historiography (history of effects, history of reception, postmodern
su bversive historiography etc'), there is a growing interest today in the time-honored historyof -problems approach (Problemgeschichte) that was developed, practiced, and execu ted with
high historical fidelity and sensi t ivity by most Neo-Kantian s. Finally, an important· debate at
the time, in which the Neo-Kantians were involved, was over the status and methodology of the
cultural or human sciences vis-a.-vis the natural sciences, predating the famous debate regarding
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.the "two cultures. II In light of current debates over the humanities, the dialogue between the
" two cultures l l defini n9 academia, and the overall project of naturalizing everything "spiri tual "

or \'mental/' the Neo-Kantians developed a whole arsenal of arguments and ~iews on these
issues, wh ich will be interesting for the philosophica l historian as well as theorists of sc ience
and the philosopher of mind.
One further issue deser ves mentioning, especially in l eday's climate: namely, the absence
of women in Neo-Kantianism. There are no women represented in this entire movement.

Indeed, one feature that made newer philosophical movements attractive, especially
pheno:nenology, was that th ey actively we lcomed women int o their circles. Indeed, women
abounded in phenomenologica l circles, even to ·the extent that it irritated the tradi t ional
founding father, Edmund Husserl. 15

Organization of this Volume
There are severa l ways in which one can present historical material of thi s sort, which are most
likely equally j ustifiable. To list a few (non-exhausti ve) opt ions:
One could make a selectio n topically, that is, based on certain philo sophi cal canonical
topi cs, ?uch as epistemology, moral philosophy, soc ial and political philosophy,
aesthetics. A lthough many Neo- Kantians thought along these canonical divisions, the
reason I have refrained from th is organization is that selec ting texts in this manner
would have obscured the manner in whic h these th inkers themselves wished to present
their wor k. Many of the conceptua l and systemat ic distinctions they employ make it
clear that these canonical divisions do not work for their system , or that they want to
overcome, modify or subvert them.
Another wou ld be an organization according to problems and di scussions at the time
when the Neo-Kantians li ved. Thus, following Be iser's latest presentation of "philosophy
after Hegel, " one could present the main d iscussions at the time, such as the materialism
controversy and the ignorabimus debate, and select texts in which the Neo-Kantians
contributed and reacted to them. The drawback here is that it would obscure the
" positive" and original work, the systemat ic intentions, on the part of the Neo-Kantians
and would present them Simply as making contributions, among other intellectual s from
other schoo ls or outside of academia altogether, to these ongoing debates. They would
be perceived as simply a voice within a larger chair. That historically this might have
been the way the Neo-Kant ians were heard is uncontested. The reason I have not opted
for th is principle of organization is due mainly t o the fact that it would not have allowed
the Neo -Kantians' posit ive contributions to come fully to t he fore .
The principle here was to select texts in tempora/succession and according to Schools.
Accord ingly, the two ma in sections, II and III, feature a selection of the main members
of the two schools in Marburg and Southwest Germany, respect ively. The advantage was
that in t hi s way the two "blocks" could be most clearly di scerned in their styles and
intenti ons. Cohen and Natorp in Marburg, and Windelband. and Rickert in Southwest
Germany, not on ly collaborated especially closely, their philosophical contributions are
not understandable without their partners. Moreover, the school s also saw themselves in
compet ition, such that a great portion of their work is tacitly or overtly directed at the ir
opponents in the other "camp, " Th is way of presentation may certa inly be contested in
light of the t'lo(o other options listed above, but so be it. Ideally, of course, the texts
presented he.re wi II be read wi ,th a deep appreciation of the philosophical canon, especially
since its reconception in Kant, and with a sensitivity to hi storical context.
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Philological Note to the Prese nt Selection
In laking on thi s project, I thought it would be a fairly easy job. After all, aIH!) one had to do
is select the re levant texts, scan them, write little introductions, et voila. The reality of the

project has proven to be much different and indeed more difficult than I antiCipated, and
completing this Reader has been, mehercle, a daunting job that has taken far too long. Indeed,
over the years, I have received many queries as to when the book wo uld final ly be on the
market, and all I could say was that the project was delayed for many reasons, some out of my
control, some within my control , but impossi ble to get around. Thus, in finally presenting the
public with this textbook, I apologize to all for iis delay. I hope that the old ·German saying
Was lange wahrt, wird endfich gut [Long in coming, but wo rth the wait] may be true of thi s
project as well.
Not to list further excuses, but to give scholars1willing to enter this area a sense of what
they are in for and what future work awaits them, a few words of explanation are in order
regarding the situation in which I found myself in undertaking this anthology. There is no doubt
that the whole area cal led II Neo-Kantianism" is, for various reasons, one big II mess. II Let us
begin with the situation in German schol arship. First, as explained above, it is not clear what
exactly Neo-Kantianism is and which philosophers or scientists fall under it. In many cases, the
"-ism" su ffi x is intended to denigrate or critique an author. Th is is no different with respect to
the label II Neo-Kantianism. " Hence, identifying who exact ly counts as a Neo-Kantian requires
historical and philosophical judgment that mayor may not be entirely fair with respect to a
certain author. Hence, certain decisions had to be made, some of which were purely pragmatic
and which may meet with approval or not, but so be it. When it comes to this area of philosophy,
it is impossible to satisfy everyone.
Philologically, the situation is made worse by t he sheer output on the part of the NeoKantians. Not only did they write entire books at the pace by which normal scholars today
produce articles; also, it was common at t he t ime to re-edi t one 's own previous books, but in
re-editing them also part ially to re-write them, noting more recent scholarship and commenting
on the latter while revisi ng one 's own text, all the while revisi ng one 's very own position (cf.,
for instance, Natorp's IIMetacr itique " of his book on Plato, which nearly reverses his earlier
position). Hence, to get a clear line on any philo sopher 's trajector y is nearly impossible to
achieve, given the additional fact that of the, say, five editions a book has received, not all are
available any longer in libraries. Thu s, part of the reconstruction of this historical situation is
guesswork at best or would require extensive research in university archives.
Th.e si tuation becomes even worse when one looks at the situation on the side of the
English language. Translations of Neo-Kantians are scarce and their quality very uneven.
Some Neo-Kantians have been translated well - not always those one wou ld recognize as
standing out today, but important and popular at the time, such as Vaihinger. Of others,
nothing or nearly nothing has been translated, or else only tangential pieces, as in the case of
Cohen and Lask. Of the existing translations, figuring out exactly which edition of the German
was translated has been an additional challenge. And of these existing translations, the quality
of them varies greatly, including the manner in which they dealt wi th the scholarship cited by
the original (again, some translated, some notL I tried to render the texts in as unified a way
as possible, since the dates of translati on (a nd accordingly standards of philological rigor) lay
wide apart. I have also added some (hopefully h~lpful) footnotes, which, however, I attempted
to keep to a minimum, sticking to the maxim that what I was producing was a Reader, not a
critica l edition (as much as the latter may be necessary>. Although it might have been desirable,
it was impossible to redo the older translations without further delaying publicat ion. Most of
them are good, even excellent, esp. in capturing the tone of voice of the philosophers of the
Wilhelmian era; some, however, leave much to be desired. But in the hopes of givi ng a fair
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presentation of the individual philosophers, I have had to " bite the bullet" when it came to
using existing-though perhaps questionable translations, rather than omitting ill}portant texts.
However, I did not content myself wi th just repr inting older and existing translations,
since this would have rendered this Reader a collection that comp letely misrepresents the
phi lologica! as well as philosophical situation. Instead, I had to commission new translations
to deliver a more well-rounded image of the Neo-Kantian movement. Though the translators
have done admirable work, I did have to go through each new trans lation several times and
consult with the respective trans lators' to ensure consistency.
It. is my hope that the resu lt will prove sati sfactory; yet, the texts produced here will not
and cannot replace a study of the original German; nor is this collection in any way a complete
rendering of the Neo*Kantian movement. ·Indeed, what [ was able to select from existing
trans lations and in addition managed to get translated represents, of course, only a snippet of
the works of these philosophers. In the case where little or nothing was translated so far, I tried
to make an even *handed selection (e.g., Cohen, with the help of Hyder and Patton 1b ). In the
case where a good amount of works has been translated, e.g., Cassirer (though the existing
older translations leave much to be desired as well), I tr ied to pick texts that move off the
beaten path, 17
The resulting bottom line is that, after many years of research in this area, this Reader
can only be a start for further wor k that will have to be carried out by others. Far from an
Edit io Critica, I, would like to refer to it as an Editio Minima, with the intention of pointing the
. reader to where more can be found. It is my hope that this Reader will not only be received wi th
charity, as merely a first stab at this nearly untapped area of European philosophical history,
but that a novel wave of in terest in the Neo*Kantians will ensue wi th in English*speaking
scholarship, which will finally give the Neo*Kantian movement - a movement more vi lified and
slandered than perhaps any other in the history of modern philosophy - its full due. To the
perceptive eye, this is .a philosophical movement rich in innovative and original thought,
profound in its scholarship, and vast in its scope.
A note of thanks goes to the fo llowi ng people:
Special than ks go to Tony Bruce from Routledge for commissioning this project, and for
having the patience" and confidence in me t o complete this Reader. It has been long in the
making and long overdue, and has suffered several setbacks. For this I apologize to him and to
,all those who have been waiting for me to finish it. I than k Adam Johnson at Routledge for
shepherding this volume through from beginning to end, including all the little things involved
in such a venture, such as rights, scanning, and so on. I also thank Peter Murray, my capyeditor
at Routledge, for his swift and attentive work.
Th is Reader could also not have been possible without the const ant input and help from a
number of people. I would like to thank the following scholars who have helped me in the
selection of texts and, in some cases, in wri t ing the introductory texts: Michael Friedman,
David Hyder, Lydia Patton, and Andrea Stai ti. Michael Friedman, David Hyder, and Lydia
Patton were also involved, partly or wholly, in translating some hitherto untranslated pieces,
in addition to the other translators, Elizabeth Behnke (H usser[), Frat:lces Bottenberg ( Natorp),
Jon Burmeister (Rickert), Brian Chance ( Lange), Alan Duncan (Windelband), and Arun Iyer
(LaskL Other scholars who have helped me with their expertise in making my final editorial
decisions were Frederick Bei ser, Steven Crowel l, Scott Edgar, Massimo Ferrari, Peter E.
Gordon, Helmut Holzhey, Rudo lf A. Makkreel, Dermot Moran, Guy Oakes, and Ulrich Sieg.
Research Assistants at Marquette University who have worked hard in helping me assemble
material and proofr.ead were: Kimberly Engels, Dana Fritz, Matthew Zdon, and Clark Wolf. I
owe them, too, a great amount of gr~titude . Finally, I thank the participants in my undergraduate
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se minar "nineteenth Century German Philosophy" in the Fa ll of 2014 at Marquette University,
who were the fi rst brave readers of the texts of this volume. [t is, in cloS ing, my hope that the
way courses such as th is one will be taught will be changed through the availability of Engli sh
translations of philosophers who were the domi nant voices in phi losophy in the nineteenth

century.
Milwaukee, Eall of 2014
Sebastian Luft

Notes
1

A previous plan was t o include a selection of French Neo~Kantians, but this would have
exploded the confines of the present selection, both thematically as well as in length. A
selection of French Neo-Kantian texts can be found in The Philosophical Forum of 2006

2
3

We ltanschauung" is the term for a wor ldview, oftentimes ideol ogica lly charged.
There are different time lines and different narratives by which one can define classical NeoKantianism. Cf. especially the work by Beiser on this movement, but d. also Crowell }C~98
and Friedmann 2000. The narrat ive given here is meant to be as open and inclusive as
possible. The purpose of this col lection and its introduction is not to steer interpretations in
any particular direction, but rather to make this material available to the English-speaking
reader.
As Crowel l aptly puts it, regarding this interwar period, the treatment of Neo-Kantianism
becomes part of "libe rat ion narratives" (Crowe ll 1998, p. 185): "here, Neo-Kantianism is
the terminus ad quem of a ' liberation from the unbreakable ci rcle of reflection' towa rd
recovery of the 'evocat ive power of conceptual thinking and philosophical language'. It thus
enters the lore of Continental philosophy as the father who had to be slain in order that
philosophy might live" (ibid.; the quotations stem from Gadamer in his recollections in
Philosophical Apprenticeships) .
That is, with the exception of the Jewish representatives of Neo-Ka ntian.ism, such as Cohen
or Cassirer, who suffered from anti-Semitic attacks throughout their ca reers.
Many a philosophy professor to this day is a caricature of this ideal, or self-consciously
emulates it, though it has certai nly also become the prime target of t.he revolutionary students
of the 19bOS, when they declared that" Vnter den Talaren, Muff von ti!usend Jahren" (under
the robes [there is] a thousand-year-old fustiness)'
Edgar 2012.
Cohen also referred to himself as "mi nister of the exterior" (s ince he liked to travel and
escape the small university town of Marburg) and Natorp as the "mi nister of the interior."
Holzhey details this school formation and its activities in Holzhey 198b11 & II.
Religion is conspicuously absent from Cohen's System of Philosophy, although the philosophy
of religion, especially the philosophical assessment of Judaism, became a dominant part of his
later work.
Cassirer, who was recruited to the University of Hamburg in 1919, was seen as a representative
of Neo-K antianism, and arguably the most important one, as becomes clear in the Davos
Debate in 1929, but he himself distanced himself somewhat from his Marburg teachers
philosophically.
This qualification pertains to the philos9~hers of that generation. Certainly, a new crop of
origina l thinkers emerged, although they did not become famous until much later. I am
thinking of names such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Dieter Henrich and JOrgen Habermas.
Cf. Makkreel, Rudolf and Sebastian Luft, Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy.
Bloom ington/Indianapolis: I ndiana University Press, 2010.
Cf., however, the 2010 essay col lec ti on edited by Makkreel and Luft, and the new essay
collection, dealing directly with this legacy, edited by Staiti and De Warren (forthcoming).
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Husserl had Edith Stein as his assistant for some time and also other female students who wrote
their dissertations under him. He discouraged them, however, from pursuing a u~iversjty career.
In t he case of Stein, he blocked her habilitation, the traditional entry gate to an academic

career, in Gottingen, and wrote a negative letter when she applied elsewhere. For a .Iist of
female phenomenologists, cf. the page of the North American Society for Early Phenomenology,
http://nasepb/og. wordpress.comJ20 1410310Blthe-women-early-phenomenologyl.

16
17

The he lp I received from other scholars is credited visibly at the outset of each reading.
A new translation of Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (all three volumes) is i n the
works, to be published by Routledge (translated by Stephen Lofts).

